↓ RECOMMENDATIONS

1 Innovatively and proactively shape international politics Global institutions and rules of peace and security policy are in crisis. The German government must finally become more proactive in shaping international politics.

2 New partnerships, new formats of cooperation Germany should forge strategic alliances in order to protect the liberal peace order wherever possible; and where it is not possible, at least preserve the multilateral framework of rules.

3 Demand and promote nuclear disarmament The German government must push for the preservation of the nuclear arms control and non-proliferation treaties. At the same time, Germany should propose concrete nuclear disarmament steps and bring to bear its influence in NATO in this regard.

4 Rethink stabilization policy Stabilization policies must deal with the root causes of conflicts instead of pursuing German and European interests. The current strong focus on strengthening security forces and administrative structures is counterproductive.

5 Cooperation on migration policy must conform with human rights The EU's cooperation with authoritarian repressive regimes on migration policy must end. It carries the risk of contributing to the prevention of democratic change and to the emergence of new crises and refugee movements.

6 Minimize military risks between NATO and Russia European security cannot withstand relations between NATO and Russia drifting further apart. The German government should increasingly advocate in the EU for new bi- and multilateral formats in order to minimize risks in the Baltic and Black Sea regions.

7 Strengthen multilateral and rule-based arms export control The German government must strengthen the EU's Common Position on arms export controls and the international Arms Trade Treaty by pushing for an arms embargo against the warring parties in Yemen together with like-minded states.

8 End standstill in the United Nations Strategic alliances are needed in order to overcome the current political gridlock on key issues of peace policy in the UN. The goal must be to secure and strengthen the UN's multilateral framework of rules.

9 International action against hate speech – but not at all costs The German government must advocate for regulating the digital space, e.g. for initiatives against hate speech at the EU and UN levels – but within the narrow confines of civil liberties and data protection rights and only with selected partners.

10 Implement peace and security policy concepts Developing pioneering concepts in peace and security policy is Germany's strong suit, but implementation is not. A visionary and proactive policy is required.

STATEMENT /
Forward into the past? Peace needs partners /

In peace and security policy, international and regional regulatory frameworks are under pressure, as are the institutions that serve to implement them. In this situation, the existing rules and institutions must be protected, and at the same time new rules and processes for securing peace must be promoted as challenges change. Neither of these can be accomplished alone; both require new partnerships. This year's Peace Report discusses such partnerships in the individual areas of peace and security policy.

Forward into the past – this is the direction in which policies that address issues of peace and security are currently heading. Achievements of multilateral cooperation that helped to globally secure peaceful coexistence are being jettisoned bit by bit: The warring parties in Syria and Yemen flout rules of non-violent conflict resolution. The Russian annexation of Crimea represents a breach of international law. International humanitarian law and fundamental human rights are globally threatened. Trust in international conventions and procedures is lost when agreements such as the INF Treaty or the nuclear agreement with Iran are rescinded. Particularly the major powers, first and foremost the US, are increasingly withdrawing political and financial support from the United Nations for its key peacekeeping functions.

This diagnosis of the erosion of established rules and the weakening of international institutions weighs all the more heavily when the global development of wars and conflicts is taken into account. The number of violent conflicts continued to increase in the past year. Especially conflicts with jihadist rebel groups in the Middle East and in Africa are growing. Roughly 68.5 million people have fled because their life is threatened by war, repression and fragile statehood.

Europe as a peace model is particularly affected by the disintegration of the international order and its rules. It has lost much of its credibility and its ability to shape events, both

internally and externally. The "refugee crisis" deepens internal European divisions. The EU is tacitly suspending the primacy of protecting human lives in the Mediterranean and accepting or even supporting inhuman conditions on Europe's "external borders", e.g. in Libya. On the border between NATO states and Russia, the parties have been relying on military deterrence since the illegal annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the start of the war in the Donbass, instead of making use of the established procedures and formats of cooperative security.

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But how can the disintegration be stopped? In view of the current challenges in peace and security policy, further divisions and the weakening of established cooperative proced-ures must be prevented. However, a mere return to the old order, a mere preservation, will not suffice, as many of the current developments are too new and too complex.

German foreign policy must therefore be proactive in identifying new partners and de-veloping and implementing new coalitions and forms of cooperation in the key areas of peace and security policy with them.

These partners could be states with which Germany forms strategic alliances in the frame-work of the UN in order to advance concrete initiatives – for example a stabilization policy focused on the root causes of conflicts or an internationally coordinated approach to hate speech on the internet. This can establish new trust in multilateral cooperation, which has taken a severe blow not least due to the change in US foreign policy under Trump.

At the same time, existing partnerships must be put to the test: For instance, in conflict situations such as in Mali, where a government contributes to violence and repression, it is problematic to rely solely on state actors as partners for German and European policies. In such cases, new cooperations including non-state actors must be entered into in order to achieve peace and security. Also, the so-called migration and mobility partnerships with authoritarian regimes must be ended if they carry the risk of themselves contributing to repression and human rights violations.

The challenge of new partnerships and coalitions lies not only in designing innovative and unconventional formats and procedures of cooperation, but mainly in their implemen-tation. We therefore expect the German government to adopt a visionary and proactive foreign, security, development and domestic policy that develops and demands new forms of cooperation – and then goes on to implement them. In the following, we provide some examples from the topics of the Peace Report 2019.

↘ MEDIATING IN THE DISPUTE OVER NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

The global nuclear order is about to shatter. The superpowers Russia and the US are dismantling the bilateral nuclear arms control treaties and fueling a new arms race. But also more generally, the tensions between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states, proponents and opponents of nuclear disarmament are mounting considerably. The 2020 Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is at risk of failing before it has started. In view of these developments, it is more important than ever to uphold the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and to search for new ways of realizing nuclear arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament.

By upholding the "Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action" (JCPOA) with Iran, the German government has demonstrated that it is willing to advance useful measures on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament even against the will of the US and in an unusual international constellation (namely together with Russia and China). It should consistently continue to pursue this path and take an approach in the debate on nuclear arms control and disarmament that is independent and geared towards cooperation. This does not mean breaking old alliances, but rather building bridges between different approaches in order to open up new perspectives for nuclear arms control and disarmament.

Together with non-nuclear European NATO states, Germany could advocate for reducing the role of nuclear weapons in NATO's strategy and for modifying nuclear sharing so as to allow tactical nuclear weapons to be withdrawn from Europe.

Germany should promote understanding between opponents and proponents of the Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty together with states that, like Germany, are under the US nuclear umbrella but continue to pursue the goal of overcoming it (e.g. Japan). The goal must be to emphasize the compatibility of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty and to offer perspectives how the states that have so far not acceded to the Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty can commit to its humanitarian goals and accede in the long term.

In Europe, Germany should strengthen its cooperation with those states that are interested in promoting understanding between proponents and critics of nuclear deterrence. The EU should return to being a credible voice in the discourse on nuclear disarmament.

↘ INCLUDE NON-STATE ACTORS IN STABILIZATION POLICY

The number of violent conflicts with more than 25 combat-related deaths per year is increasing again globally; in 2017, it was 131. The bulk of armed conflicts is characterized by the involvement, besides state actors, of a large number of non-state and external actors (e.g. UN missions, individual states). However, the stabilization policy under which Western states and international organizations combine their military, police, diplomatic and development interventions focuses mainly on restoring and enforcing statehood. The concerns and interests of the populations are not sufficiently taken into account.

For instance, the stabilization policy in Mali primarily wants to assert European interests. It aims to fight terrorism and organized crime and to limit refugee and migration movements from the Sahel northward. The intention is to strengthen the Malian state – first and foremost its security forces. However, the Malian government is considered to be corrupt and closely tied to criminal and sometimes even jihadist groups. The Malian security forces have repeatedly perpetrated massive human rights violations and significantly contributed to the escalation of violence.

Human security has drastically deteriorated on the ground, not least because these entanglements are not sufficiently being factored into the policy of stabilization. The implementation of the peace agreement of 2015 has made little progress. A stabilization approach that strengthens the government as a partner even though it is primarily responsible for existing instability cannot succeed. The cooperation with the Malian state thus needs to be renegotiated. Alternatively, formats of interaction with civil society and with local communities must be established. For if stabilization policy is to bring peace not only in Mali but also in other countries, the security of the population must take centre stage.

↘ NO MIGRATION PARTNERSHIPS AT THE EXPENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Little progress has been made in recent years in key dimensions of sustainable peace-keeping. The record with respect to Goal 16 of the Agenda for Sustainable Development (peace, justice and strong institutions) is particularly sobering. The number of refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced persons doubled from 2007 to 2017, from 30 million to 68.5 million. War, repression and fragile statehood are the driving forces of this development. At the same time, refugees often continue to be exposed to violence and exclusion in host regions.

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The EU is not a pioneer of a humane refugee policy. Quite the contrary: It pursues a closed-door policy and relies on problematic partnerships. The EU has the most deadly external border in the world. 35,000 people are estimated to have drowned in the Mediterranean since the year 2000. The European external border is characterized by a comprehensive and sophisticated "non-entrée regime". For several years now, this has included so-called migration and mobility partnerships with states of transit and origin such as Libya, Sudan or Turkey that have authoritarian governments. Development cooperation is increasingly subordinated to considerations of security and migration policy. European support for the G5 Sahel Joint Force of the countries of Mauretania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad illustrates the priority of security and military considerations. This is at the expense of policies oriented towards human rights.

A reorientation is required. Regional initiatives such as the Cartagena process in Latin America or the progressive refugee policies in Uganda and Ethiopia offer promising approaches that deserve to be supported in partnerships. At the global level, financially strong states must join forces to counter the dramatic underfunding of the UNHCR. But above all, the German government should push for legal access routes in the EU. The initiative for a humanitarian European visa that the European Parliament launched in December 2018 is an important step.

↘ CONDUCT POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH RUSSIA

The security situation in Europe is deteriorating. Since the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine, NATO and the Russian Federation alike are pursuing the restoration of conventional deterrence, in particular in the Baltic and Black Sea regions. Proven mechanisms of cooperative security are disintegrating: Since the suspension of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) in 2007 there has been a lack of reliable treaty frameworks as a basis of information exchange, mutual observations and inspections. The NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997 and the CFE Final Act of 1999 are also at risk. Mutual distrust is blocking formats of conflict regulation such as the contact group at the level of governments and foreign ministers between Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine on issues of the Donbass conflict (Normandy format).

In order to prevent a further erosion of the relationship, German foreign policy should continue the Structured Dialogue and additionally promote formats for military risk minimization and subregional conflict management. This could take place in the framework of bilateral and multilateral agreements on the prevention of incidents in and over international waters. Moreover, status-neutral mechanisms are required for further processing

the conflicts in the post-Soviet space, that is, procedures in which political and territorial issues of status can be put to aside. The conflict parties can first agree on a series of steps, for instance confidence-building measures, which are achievable without resolving the status of the parties. This could occur in the framework of existing formats and under the mediation of trusted third parties. A political dialogue at the highest level is required as a basis of an effective strategy of risk limitation at all levels, i.e. global, regional and subregional. The German government should advocate for this in the EU.

20 ↘ **STRENGTHEN MULTILATERAL AND RULE-BASED ARMS EXPORT CONTROL**

Germany exports weapons to authoritarian regimes and to regions of tension. The current halt to arms exports to Saudi Arabia must not be a mere moratorium, but must rather lead to a permanent departure from this fatal policy. Finally, for once the German government is adhering to the rules of the EU's Common Position on arms export controls and the international Arms Trade Treaty. It must not undermine these multilateral regulatory frameworks on account of the plans for a European and in particular German-French arms cooperation. These are false avowals of friendship, they weaken the international rule-based order and ultimately also the EU. Instead, the German government must push for strengthening multilateral arms export control together with like-minded states such as the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Austria, Norway or Canada. To this end, it should advocate in the EU and in the UN Security Council for an arms embargo against all warring parties in Yemen.

↘ **OVERCOMING STANDSTILL IN THE UNITED NATIONS THROUGH STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS**

The United Nations (UN) are weakened by the political confrontation of major powers, the financial and political withdrawal of the US from multilateral activities and the fragmented organizational and work processes in the area of peacekeeping. The UN cannot take action, at least not sufficient action, in many of the current violent conflicts: Key decisions in the UN Security Council are being blocked by individual council members through increased use of the veto. At the same time, the budget for UN peace missions is shrinking.

These problems are not solved by a permanent German seat on the Security Council. Instead, the German government should invest its energy in strategic partnerships and thus take on an active and visible role in the United Nations. Foreign Minister Maas set the programmatic point of departure for this with the Like-Minded Initiative. Strategic

partnerships can help protect the peacekeeping budget that is threatened by further cuts, advance the long overdue debate on a reform of the process of mandating UN peace missions and revive the strengthening of international humanitarian law after the failed Geneva Process. Furthermore, strategic partnerships within the Security Council could be used to launch urgently needed reforms in the work processes of the UN.

However, to achieve this goal, the German government needs to clearly define its goals for such partnerships. Is the goal to strengthen the liberal world order or "only" the multilateral order? The former would imply a considerably smaller, namely liberal-democratic set of partners and thus also less manoeuvrability in the current world order. The latter offers more flexibility in finding potential partners but raises dilemmas: between the promotion of the rule of law and democracy on the one hand and the protection of multilateral agreements through partnerships with states that share these values to a limited degree or not at all on the other hand. The Peace Report's recommendation in this regard is to protect the liberal order wherever possible and, where it is not possible, to at least preserve the multilateral regulatory framework. New partnerships and cooperations can contribute to this.

↘ INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS AGAINST HATE SPEECH

New international partnerships against the manipulation of democratic processes and against the mobilization towards radicalism and violence in social media are urgently needed. This is illustrated by the attempts originating from Russia to influence electoral processes and by the transnational communication strategies of extreme right-wing and jihadist groups.

Various initiatives and programmes are currently being launched internationally. Even though the US government is currently calling many multilateral agreements into question, the initiative of a UN Group of Governmental Experts, which is geared towards cooperation and is being advanced by the US, deserves the German government's support. It is to develop basic guidelines for community-oriented internet regulation based on international law by 2021. A more critical stance should be taken towards the Open-ended Working Group, which was initiated by Russia and which focuses on national sovereignty – and thus on national control of the internet.

By contrast, the action plan against hate speech initiated by UN Secretary-General Guterres enables new alliances, and the German government should take an active part in shaping them. Canada, New Zealand, South Korea and Japan are already part of new multilateral initiatives of the German government. The action plan should also be reflected in

these initiatives. Whether the US will take an active stance against hate speech under its current government appears doubtful. An additional EU-wide coordination and regulation of social media is therefore necessary. Whereas at the UN level the focus is on standing up against efforts of illiberal states to impose censorship and control, other tasks are pending at the EU level: Here, agreements are usually not binding, and regulation is to a large extent geared towards control. This policy should be supplemented by an agenda that actively promotes primary prevention. That means providing more funds for practical initiatives and research in the areas of political education and media skills, but also informational work in educational institutions and in the penal system. The cooperation with international social media corporations should avoid transferring too much responsibility from the state to the corporations. Moreover, transparency rules should not only be declared, but also enforced – through independent agencies and legal obligations.

CONCLUSION

Despite the crisis of the global peace order, several opportunities present themselves to the German government to take resolute action for peace and security. Together with new and old partners, state and non-state actors, Germany can enter into alliances and cooperations in order to advance political initiatives – in nuclear arms control and disarmament, in stabilizing war and post-war societies, in the conflict between NATO and Russia, in fighting the root causes of forced migration, for a reform of the UN, and against hate speech and the manipulation of election campaigns on the internet. This requires new, innovative formats of cooperation that restore trust in multilateral agreements and institutions.

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